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Over Foreign Investment in Agriculture
James Laurenceson,1 Paul F. Burke and Edward Wei
Abstract
This paper estimates a model of how the Australian public’s preferences 
over foreign investment in agriculture are determined. The results show that 
the attributes of foreign investment of greatest concern to the public are not 
the same as those used by the foreign investment approvals regime to flag 
proposals for scrutiny.
Introduction
In a 2012 poll, 63 per cent of Australians said that they were ‘strongly against’ 
‘… the Australian government allowing foreign companies to buy Australian 
farmland to grow crops or farm livestock’ (Lowy Institute 2012). A further 
18  per  cent said they were ‘somewhat against’, taking total disapproval to 
more than 80 per cent. Another poll in 2014 reported that 60 per cent of the 
public were against ‘… the Australian government allowing foreign companies 
to invest in agriculture’, as compared with 38 per cent who were in favour 
(Lowy  Institute 2014). Along with foreign investment in ports and airports, 
this was the lowest level of support across industry sectors, and compared with 
58 per cent in favour for manufacturing and 55 per cent for the financial sector.
1  University of Technology Sydney, james.laurenceson@uts.edu.au. The authors would like to thank the 
editor, an anonymous referee, Peter Drysdale, Jane Goley, Zhangyue Zhou and Daniel Quiggin for comments 
received on an earlier version of this paper. Research assistance from Srishti Sethi is gratefully acknowledged.
AgendA, Volume 22, number 1, 2015
46
The basic rationale for Australia having a foreign-investment approvals regime 
is to provide the public with reassurance that proposed investments will 
bring community benefits. Yet, at least in the case of agriculture, the polling 
evidence presented above suggests that the regime is struggling to provide this 
reassurance. There could be a simple explanation, at least in part. The regime 
will only provide the public with reassurance if its design is consistent with 
how their preferences over foreign investment are determined. For  example, 
the approvals regime makes extensive use of dollar-value thresholds. Currently, 
a proposed investment from a foreign, privately owned company in an Australian 
agribusiness is only scrutinised by the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) 
if its value exceeds $252 million.2 However, the Australian government has 
announced its intention to reduce this threshold to $55 million in December 
2015 (FIRB 2015).3 In March 2015, the dollar-value threshold for foreign 
purchases of agricultural land was cut from a non-cumulative $252 million to 
a cumulative $15 million.4,5 Yet whether dollar-value thresholds act to provide 
the public with reassurance depends on whether it is the dollar value of foreign 
investment that is relevant to their preference formation. If preferences are 
insensitive to the dollar value, or if they are positively related – that is, the 
public prefers higher dollar-value foreign investments to lower dollar-value 
ones – it would be unsurprising if the regime failed to instil confidence. At the 
same time, the danger is that moves to lower dollar-value thresholds might add 
to the perceived cost of investing and make Australia’s agricultural sector a less 
attractive destination as a result (Schlesinger 2015).
How public preferences over foreign investment in agriculture are determined 
is the question this paper seeks to answer. It does so using a choice modelling 
methodology. This approach invites members of the public to choose between a 
range of foreign investment scenarios that differ according to various attributes 
such as the dollar value, investor country of origin, and so on. In considering and 
trading off different investment attributes, those most relevant in determining 
preferences can be established.
The key finding is that there is a sizeable gap between the attributes of foreign 
investment that are of greatest concern to the public and the attributes the 
approvals regime uses to flag investment proposals for scrutiny. This divergence 
2  Exceptions exist for foreign investment from New Zealand, the US and Chile, which have an approvals 
threshold of $1.094 billion due to concessions embedded in long-standing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
(FIRB 2015).
3  This lower threshold will not apply to investors from New Zealand, the US and Chile, who will continue 
to have a threshold of $1.094 billion. It will, however, apply to countries that have recently negotiated FTAs 
with Australia, such as Japan, Korea and China (FIRB 2015).
4  A cumulative threshold means that if a foreign investor has previously bought agricultural land, the value 
of these past purchases will count towards the $15 million threshold for new purchases.
5  Exceptions exist for investors from New Zealand, the US and Chile, who will have a $1.094 billion 
threshold. Investors from Singapore and Thailand will have a threshold of $50 million.
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may help to explain why the level of Australian public support for foreign 
investment in agriculture is limited. The most important investment attribute 
influencing how public preferences are determined is the foreign ownership 
share of an Australian agribusiness that a proposed investment will bring. 
Yet  the foreign ownership share is not an attribute the approvals regime 
emphasises. Conversely, while the regime singles out higher dollar-value foreign 
investments for special attention, the results show that, everything else held 
constant, the public actually prefers higher dollar-value investments to lower 
dollar-value ones.  
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to consider how public 
preferences over foreign investment are determined, in Australia or elsewhere. 
It does, however, sit within a broader body of literature that seeks to provide 
critical reflection on the state of the foreign investment approvals regime. 
For  example, Drysdale and Findlay (2009) and Drysdale (2011) considered 
whether investment from government-owned enterprises, particularly those 
from China, warranted special attention in the approvals process, while 
Mendelsohn and Fels (2014) examined whether the role and processes of the 
FIRB matched regulatory best practice.
The regulation of foreign investment 
in agriculture in Australia
The foundation of Australia’s foreign investment approvals regime is the Foreign 
Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 and the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers 
Regulation 1989. It was the 1975 Act that gave rise to the establishment of the 
FIRB in 1976. The job of the FIRB is to examine proposed foreign investments 
in Australia and make a recommendation to the Treasurer as to whether they 
are in the ‘national interest’. The approvals regime is intended ‘… to reassure 
the Australian community that foreign investment was being monitored for 
the benefits that it brought to the Australian community’ (Drysdale 2011: 
56). The  most recent, high-profile instance of proposed foreign investment 
in agriculture to fail this ‘national interest’ test was the sale of GrainCorp to 
American agribusiness Archer Daniels Midland in 2013.
The investment attributes used by the regime to determine which foreign 
investment proposals are scrutinised by the FIRB have evolved over time. 
Currently before Parliament is the Foreign Acquisition and Takeovers 
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Legislation Amendment Bill 2015 which, amongst other things, is intended to 
enable the lowering of dollar-value screening thresholds for foreign investment 
in agriculture.6
Aside from dollar-value thresholds, the approvals regime also makes a sharp 
distinction between whether a proposal is coming from a foreign government-
owned or privately owned company. All investments from foreign government-
owned companies require FIRB scrutiny, irrespective of their dollar value. 
This distinction was introduced in 2009 and was widely perceived as a response 
to growing investment interest in Australia by Chinese government-owned 
companies (Mendelsohn and Fels 2014). Larem (2011) found that these 
regulations have contributed to perceptions by Chinese investors that Australia 
was a more difficult place to invest compared with other countries. Nonetheless, 
such a distinction in the approvals regime may still be worthwhile if it serves to 
build confidence amongst the Australian public that these proposals are being 
vetted for the community benefits they will bring. The problem is that it is not 
known whether the ownership type of a foreign investor is in fact an issue of 
concern to the public. The same is true for the dollar value of foreign investment.
Rather than the dollar value of foreign investment or the ownership type of 
a foreign investor, public preferences might instead be more importantly 
determined by other attributes. For example, amongst others, the public might 
be more concerned by the ownership share of an Australian agribusiness that 
a foreign company will acquire through an investment and/or the country 
of origin of the foreign investor.
Methodology
To investigate how public preferences are formed, this paper adopts a discrete 
choice experiment (DCE) approach, which has yet to be applied in this 
setting but has the potential to offer new insights. When investigating public 
preferences, traditional polling techniques ask respondents to consider one 
attribute of an issue without referring to, or trading these off against, other 
attributes. What  this means is that respondents have no real incentive to 
provide clear direction on what attributes are most important in determining 
their preferences. A DCE provides a way to disentangle the impact that different 
attributes have on preferences.
6  While not directly related to the approvals process, also currently before Parliament is the Register of 
Foreign Ownership of Agricultural Land Bill 2015. The purpose of this legislation is to better understand the 
extent to which agricultural land is owned by foreign interests.
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DCEs have their roots in random utility theory and have a long history of being 
applied in transport, economics and marketing (for example, Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman 1985; Burke et al. 2010; Burke 2013; Louviere et al. 2000; Manski 1977; 
McFadden 1974; Train 2009). More recently, DCEs have been used in areas as 
diverse as education (Aubusson et al. 2014; Burke et al. 2015), health (Flynn et 
al. 2010; Lancsar et al. 2013) and climate change (Carson et al. 2010).
A DCE works by presenting survey respondents with a hypothetical scenario 
called ‘a choice set’. Each choice set presents several alternatives: say, investment 
profile A, investment profile B and investment profile C. Respondents are asked 
to nominate which option they believe best matches a given criterion; in this 
instance, which investment profile option they most and least prefer. By asking 
respondents to select the most preferred and the least preferred profiles, a full 
ranking of the three investment profiles in each scenario can be collected. It also 
allows for testing of whether preference formation differs depending on if the 
investment choice is framed in terms of acceptance (most preferred) or objection 
(least preferred).
The investment alternatives are described by various attributes. In turn, each 
attribute has two or more levels. For example, one attribute of foreign investment 
could be country of origin. The levels for this attribute could be China, Japan, 
the US and the UK.
In this study, we considered seven attributes of foreign investment that might 
be expected to have an impact on public preferences.7 These comprised:
• Attribute 1: financial status of the Australian company. The Australian 
agribusiness receiving the foreign investment is a) on the verge of bankruptcy; 
or b) financially sound and looking to grow. That is, this attribute has two 
levels.
• Attribute 2: years in operation for the Australian company. 
The  Australian agribusiness receiving the foreign investment has been in 
operation for a) five years; b) 10 years; c) 20 years; or d) 50 years. That is, this 
attribute has four levels.
• Attribute 3: ownership type of the foreign investor. The foreign 
company investing in the Australian agribusiness is a) government-owned; 
or b) privately owned.
7  As theory offers little guidance and there are no previous empirical studies that have considered how 
public preferences towards foreign investment are determined, these expectations are based  on the actual 
criteria found in the approvals regime, as well as anecdotal evidence found in media sources that deal with the 
public response to instances of foreign investment.
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• Attribute 4: country of origin of foreign investor. The foreign company 
investing in the Australian agribusiness is from a) China; b) Japan; c) the UK; 
or d) the US.
• Attribute 5: dollar value of foreign investment. The amount of the 
foreign investment is a randomly drawn dollar value from 50 per cent below 
$55 million to 50 per cent above $55 million. Recall that from December 
2015, $55 million is the proposed dollar-value threshold for which foreign 
investment in an Australian agribusiness will be scrutinised by the FIRB.
• Attribute 6: local management control. After the foreign investment, the 
Australian agribusiness will have Australian citizens in a) a majority of the 
board and senior management positions; or b) a minority of the board and 
senior management positions.
• Attribute 7: foreign ownership share. After the foreign investment, the 
foreign company will own a randomly drawn percentage from 10 per cent 
to 100 per cent of the Australian agribusiness. The 10 per cent lower 
bound is chosen on the basis that an ownership share above 10 per cent is 
typically classified as being direct investment and will bring some degree of 
management control to the foreign investor.
Each respondent was given eight DCE scenarios to complete. An example of the 
DCE task is presented in Figure 1.8 Note that each scenario relates to brownfield 
investment (that is, a foreign investor acquiring equity in an existing company) 
rather than greenfield investment (that is, a foreign investor establishing a new 
company). It is the former that typically generates the greatest controversy in 
media commentary.
The levels for each of the attributes presented to respondents were determined 
using a completely randomised design in order to detect potential higher-
order effects. For example, one specific higher-order interaction that may be 
of interest is China country of origin and government-owned ownership type. 
That is, the Australian public may display a particular sensitivity to a foreign 
investment proposal if it is from a Chinese, government-owned company. 
However, this interaction term proved statistically insignificant, as did nearly 
all other interactions. As a result, for brevity and parsimony what follows is a 
presentation of the main effects only models.
8  Other elements of the DCE, such as the introduction given to respondents, is available from the authors 
upon request.
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Figure 1: Example of Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE)
in this scenario, three cases of foreign investments in Australian agribusiness are shown below. 
please examine the details of these investments and select the investment case that you agree 
with the MOST, and the investment case that you agree with the LEAST.
investment attributes Investment A Investment B Investment C
1.  The Australian agribusiness 
receiving the foreign investment is








2.  The Australian agribusiness 
receiving the foreign investment 
has been in operation for
5 years 50 years 10 years
3.  The foreign company investing in 
the Australian agribusiness is
government 
owned
privately owned government 
owned
4.  The foreign company investing in 
the Australian agribusiness is from
China Japan uS
5.  The amount of the foreign 
investment is
$30.3 million $69.3 million $77.6 million
6.  After the foreign investment, the 
Australian agribusiness will have 
Australian citizens in a












7.  After the foreign investment, the 
foreign company will own
94% 
of the Australian 
agribusiness
28% 
of the Australian 
agribusiness
88% 
of the Australian 
agribusiness
Q1.  which investment do you agree with 
the MOST? ¨ ¨ ¨
Q2.  which investment do you agree with 
the LEAST? ¨ ¨ ¨
Data
The sample was drawn from the Australian panel of a global online data panel 
company proportional to key demographic statistics in census data from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). All respondents were eligible to vote in 
the next federal election. In total, data were collected from 1,523 respondents. 
This means that model estimation was conducted on the basis of preferences 
exhibited over 1,523 × 8 = 12,184 foreign investment scenarios.
Summary statistics for the sample relating to sex, age, location, ethnic 
background,  household income and education are shown in Table 1. 
The  proportion of the sample holding a Bachelor degree or higher is 
42.1 per cent. This compares with the average of the working-age population 
of 27.9 per cent (ABS 2012). The difference mostly likely arises from the opt-in 
nature of online data panels. That is, to participate in such a survey, online 
know-how and savvy is required and this is likely to be positively correlated 
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with educational attainment. Fortunately, there is little reason to think that this 
difference will bias our results. The sample still comprises 57.9 per cent, or 
592 respondents, who do not have a Bachelor degree qualification, including 
10.9 per cent who did not finish Year 12. These varying levels of educational 
attainment can be interacted with investment attributes to examine whether 
there are any statistically significant differences in how preferences are 
determined. These results are discussed below.
Table 1: Summary statistics of respondents (n=1,523)
Sex Percentage Born in Australia Percentage
male 50 yes 79.8
Female 50 no 20.2
Age Percentage Language at home Percentage
up to 24 12.3 english only 86.4
25–34 20.9 other languages 13.6
35–44 19.8
45–54 19.8 Annual household income Percentage
55–64 15.1 below $52k 31.3
65–74   8.3 $52k–104k 32.4
75+   3.7 $104k–156k 15.2
$156k–208k   4.7
Location Percentage $208k +   3.2
nSw 33.3 prefer not  to answer 13.1
ViC 24.8
Qld 19.5 Highest non-school qualification Percentage
SA   7.6 bachelor degree or higher 42.1
wA 10.0 University/TAFE diploma or certificate 37.0
ACt   1.6 none of the above 20.9
tAS   2.4
nt   1.0
Results
A multinomial choice model (MNL) was used to analyse data collected from the 
1,523 respondents. Three models were estimated based on the most preferred 
investment profile, the least preferred investment profile and an aggregation of 
the two sets of responses (that is, a combined model). The results are presented 
in Table 2.
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Each variable was included and excluded from the combined model to assess 
its statistical significance in improving model fit. The log-likelihoods between 
the final and each restricted model can be compared against a chi-square 
distribution, or equivalently the AIC and BIC criterion. These comparisons 
allow the impact of each variable to be compared by taking into account the 
difference in degrees of freedom associated with any one set of variables. 
The attribute most responsible for improvements in model fit was the foreign 
ownership share. This was followed by the financial status of the Australian 
company, the extent of local management control, the country of origin of 
the foreign investor, the dollar value of foreign investment and the number 
of years the Australian agribusiness had been in operation. The only variable 
not contributing to a statistically significant improvement in model fit was the 
ownership type of the foreign investor.
We now discuss the findings for each variable in greater detail in order of their 
significance.
Foreign ownership share (attribute 7)
Based on the combined model, the most statistically significant attribute of 
foreign investment determining public preferences is the foreign ownership 
share. The coefficient is negative. This means that, everything else held constant 
(for example, the investment is from the same country, and so on), as the share 
of foreign ownership increases, the public prefers the investment less. Tests also 
reveal the relationship between the foreign ownership share and preferences 
is linear.
Beyond sign and statistical significance, coefficient values can also be interpreted 
by looking at the marginal changes in outcomes they imply using representative 
values. By way of illustration, consider foreign ownership shares of 10 per cent 
(the lower bound) compared with 100 per cent (the upper bound). The coefficient 
of -0.016 implies that if the public is choosing between these two investment 
profiles, the probability that the one featuring 10 per cent foreign ownership 
will be preferred to one featuring 100 per cent foreign ownership is 81 per cent.9
What makes this finding potentially instructive for policy formation is that 
while the foreign ownership share is the attribute of greatest concern to the 
public, it does not feature prominently in the foreign investment approvals 
regime. Instead, as noted earlier, the regime focuses on the dollar value of 
foreign investment. Sometimes the FIRB may include a condition that relates to 
the foreign ownership share. For example, in 2012 it approved Shandong Ruyi, 
9  The preference associated with foreign ownership at only 10 per cent compared with 100 per cent is based 
on the function  (exp(10*-0.0164) / (exp(10*-0.0164) + exp(100*-0.0164))), while holding everything else constant.
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a Chinese–Japanese investor, to purchase an 80 per cent share of Cubbie Station, 
a Queensland cotton and irrigation property. The remaining 20 per cent stake 
was bought by an Australian company, Lempriere Group. The FIRB’s approval 
required that Shandong Ruyi reduce its holding to 51 per cent within three 
years. However, if Shandong Ruyi’s purchase had been less than the $252 million 
value threshold specified in the approvals regime, the foreign ownership share 
would have been irrelevant as the deal would not have required scrutiny 
by FIRB in the first place.
Financial status of the Australian company (attribute 1)
The second-most significant determinant of preferences was the financial status 
of the Australian agribusiness. The coefficient was negative, implying that the 
public prefer a foreign investment less when it is in an Australian agribusiness 
on the verge of bankruptcy. A possible interpretation is that the public fears 
such investment might result in a loss of domestic assets at ‘fire sale’ prices.
Local management control (attribute 6)
The next-most significant determinant of preferences was whether foreign 
investment would see a majority or a minority of board and senior management 
positions being held by Australian citizens. The coefficient is positive, meaning 
that the public prefers a foreign investment more if Australian citizens occupy 
a majority of board and senior management positions.
Country of origin of the foreign investor (attribute 4)
The evidence for the country of origin of the foreign investor having a significant 
impact on preferences was mixed. On the one hand, the coefficient for the UK 
was positive and statistically significant. That is, if foreign investment is from the 
UK, the public prefer it more. In contrast, the coefficient for China was negative 
and statistically significant, meaning the public prefer it less. The coefficients for 
the US and Japan were positive and negative respectively, but only marginally 
statistically significant or insignificant.
That said, it is useful to read this finding in conjunction with those above. 
In particular, while investment from China was preferred less than investment 
from the UK, this preference appears readily moderated. For example, 
the  coefficient values imply that, everything else held constant, the public 
would be indifferent between an investment profile featuring investment 
from the UK that resulted in 70 per cent foreign ownership, and another that 
featured investment from China that resulted in 53 per cent foreign ownership. 
Or put another way, the public would prefer an investment profile that featured 
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investment from China and with Australian citizens in a majority of board and 
senior management positions, compared to investments from the US or Japan 
with Australian citizens in a minority.
Aside from the combined model, the results in Table 2 also report on significant 
effects relating to the decision by respondents to indicate their most preferred 
investment option and, separately, their least preferred option. In most instances, 
the effects across these models are not significantly different. However, this is 
not the case with respect to investor country of origin. Specifically, the results 
indicate that the opposition to investment from China is significantly stronger 
when the choice is framed in terms of objection (least preferred) relative to 
acceptance (most preferred).
Dollar value of foreign investment (attribute 5)
The coefficient to the dollar value of foreign investment is positive, implying 
that as the dollar value increases the public prefers it more. Model tests reveal 
the impact of the dollar value of foreign investment on preferences is linear. 
This result is not inconsistent with the finding that the public prefers a lower 
foreign ownership share: the public may value large capital contributions while 
at the same time preferring a greater proportion of the equity in a joint venture 
to be held by local interests.
This result stands out for two reasons. First, the dollar value of foreign investment 
is shown to be an attribute of foreign investment of only modest statistical 
significance in determining public preferences. Yet in the approvals regime it is 
the single most important attribute of investment used to flag whether proposals 
are scrutinised by the FIRB. Second, the coefficient is positive, which means 
that recent moves in the approvals regime to reduce dollar-value screening 
thresholds are unlikely to increase public confidence in the community benefits 
of foreign investment. This is because the public actually prefers higher dollar-
value investments to lower dollar-value ones.
Years in operation (attribute 2)
The years that an Australian agribusiness has been in operation generally has 
a statistically insignificant impact on preferences. The one exception was if the 
company had been in operation for 50 years. In this case, the public prefers the 
foreign investment less. This may indicate that the public has some reluctance 
seeing foreign investment in Australian companies that might be regarded 
as iconic.
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Ownership type (attribute 3)
Whether investment was coming from a foreign company that was government-
owned or privately owned had a statistically insignificant impact on preferences.
Once again this points to a gap between the attributes of foreign investment that 
are of greatest concern to the public and the attributes the approvals regime 
uses to flag proposals for scrutiny by the FIRB. As noted earlier, all investment 
from foreign government-owned companies require FIRB screening, irrespective 
of dollar value. What this result means is that the regime is likely to add to 
perceptions by investors such as Chinese government-owned companies that 
the approvals process is restrictive, while at the same time not providing the 
public with greater confidence in the community benefits.
Socio-demographic heterogeneity 
in preference formation
The analysis so far has considered how preferences are formed by the average 
member of the Australian public. The question arises, however, whether 
different socio-demographic groups might form their preferences differently: for 
example, city dwellers versus non-metropolitan residents; men versus women; 
and so on. The most straightforward way to consider these possibilities is to test 
whether there are any statistically significant differences in interactions between 
socio-demographic characteristics and foreign investment attributes. In a choice 
modelling exercise, socio-demographic characteristics can be introduced into 
the estimation procedure using effects coding. This is akin to a dummy variable 
approach in regular regression. The difference is that instead of modelling, 
say, sex using zero and one, the coding takes the form of one and minus one. 
For attributes with more than two levels, one level is used as the base and is the 
negative sum of the other levels. In the dummy variable approach, the reference 
level is coded as zero.
Generally, few differences were found. For example, no differences were revealed 
with respect to education levels or whether respondents were living in cities 
versus non-metropolitan areas. However, age and sex did show up differences 
with respect to increased levels of foreign ownership, reduced levels of local 
management control and China as a source country of investment. Specifically, 
older persons and females were found to be significantly more sensitive to 
investment options along these lines.10
10  Specific results with respect to the interaction between socio-demographic characteristics and foreign 
investment attributes are available from the authors upon request.
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Conclusion
This paper began by observing that the Australian public has reservations 
over foreign investment in agriculture. A model of how public preferences over 
foreign investment are determined was then estimated. The results highlight 
one possible reason why public support may be limited. There is a gap between 
the attributes of foreign investment that are of greatest concern to the public 
and the attributes used by the approvals regime to flag proposals for scrutiny. 
Morever, recent changes to the approvals regime, such as lowering the dollar-
value threshold that triggers FIRB review and instigating a different approvals 
process for proposals from foreign government-owned investors, fail to close the 
gap. This divergence may have implications for how the Australian government 
forms policy in this domain.
Another implication of the findings is that they may provide insight for foreign 
investors and their Australian partners into how cooperation can be structured 
to gain better public acceptance. For example, while investment proposals from 
China do suffer from a negative country-of-origin effect, this effect is readily 
moderated by other attributes of the investment, such as placing Australian 
citizens in a majority of the board and senior management positions. A survey 
of Chinese investors in Australia in 2014 found that negative media coverage 
was one of the key challenges they faced. Only 16 per cent ‘agreed’ with the 
statement that ‘Australian media are supportive of Chinese investment’. None 
‘strongly agreed’ (KPMG 2014). To the extent that media coverage both reflects 
and informs public preferences, the findings of this study could act to overcome 
this barrier.
Whether the public preferences over foreign investment modelled in this paper 
also hold for proposals outside of the agribusiness sector in Australia, or in 
other countries, remains to be verified. Nonetheless, the methodology adopted 
in this paper could readily be used to answer these questions.
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